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Europeanization Subverted?  
The European Union’s Promotion of Good Governance and the 
Fight against Corruption in the Southern Caucasus
Tanja A. Börzel and Yasemin Pamuk
Abstract
In order to foster peace, stability and prosperity in its near abroad, the European Union has invoked the 
European Neighbourhood Policy that seeks to transform the domestic structures of the Newly Independent 
States in the post-Soviet space thus building a “ring of friends” that share European norms and principles of 
democracy, rule of the law, market economy, and good governance. Empirical evidence, however, suggests 
that the EU’s capacity to hit across its borders and to realize its reform agenda seems limited. Moreover, 
most neighborhood countries appear to be stuck in transition and suffer from serious problems of both 
weak state capacity and defect democracy. Hence, EU efforts may also bear the danger of unintended and 
negative effects on the domestic structures of states, as its policies and institutions do not only empower 
liberal reform coalitions, to the extent that they exist in the first place, but can also bolster the power of in-
cumbent authoritarian and corrupt elites. This paper intends to capture this “dark side of Europeanization” 
(Schimmelfennig 2007). It thus conceptualizes ENP as a political opportunity structure that provides oppor-
tunities and constraints to both supporters and opponents of the European Union’s reform agenda. Which 
of the two ultimately get empowered depends not only on the EU’s capacity to push for reforms but also 
on the pull of domestic actors.
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1. Introduction1
With the borders of the EU having moved eastwards, students of Europeanization have been awarded 
yet another real-world experiment. As in case of the accession countries, the EU seeks to transform the 
domestic structures of the Newly Independent States (NIS) that used to be part of the Soviet Union and 
now form the immediate backyard of the EU. In order to foster peace, stability and prosperity in its near 
abroad, the EU seeks to build a “ring of friends” (European Commission 2003) that share the same norms 
and principles of good governance as the EU and its member states and adapt their domestic institutions 
and policies accordingly. Unlike the Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC), the Western Balkans 
and Turkey, however, the European neighborhood countries (ENC) appear to be stuck in transition and suf-
fer from serious problems of both weak state capacity and defect democracy. Moreover, they do not have 
a membership perspective, at least not in the foreseeable future. 
Studies on “Neighbourhood Europeanization” (Gawrich et al. 2009) have shown that the EU’s capacity to hit 
across its borders has been limited (Smith 2005; Weber et al. 2007; Sasse 2008; Kelley 2005; Lavenex 2004). 
Our paper argues that the EU has induced some formal institutional change, which, however, has helped 
to stabilize rather than change existing regimes. Thus, we do observe the Europeanization of domestic 
structures of formerly Soviet republics, which, however, appears to have opposite effects of what the EU 
intends to achieve with its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). In order to explore these pathologies 
of Europeanization, we focus on the EU’s attempts to promote good governance, in particular on the fight 
against corruption. The post-Soviet area features some of the most corrupt countries in the world, includ-
ing the Southern Caucasus region. High adaptation costs and limited incentives render Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and Georgia least likely cases for Europeanization and domestic change. Our comparative study will show 
that despite high misfit and low pressure for adaptation from above and below, all three have responded 
to the EU’s demands for good governance introducing similar formal institutional changes. Yet, rather than 
systematically fighting corruption, incumbent regimes have exploited the EU selectively implementing 
anti-corruption policies to cut the power resources of their political opponents.
The first part of the paper develops a “bottom-up” perspective on Europeanization and (unintended) do-
mestic change, focusing on how incumbent elites rather than liberal reform coalitions have used the EU 
to advance their interests, consolidating rather than changing existing power structures. The second part 
compares how Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia have responded to EU demands for domestic change in 
fighting corruption. We will show how all three regimes introduced similar formal institutions and also en-
gaged in some anti-corruption activities. Yet, the domestic changes we observe are less driven by EU pres-
sure for adaptation. Rather, the incumbent regimes have managed to exploit the fight against corruption to 
consolidate their power. As a result, Europeanization tends to stabilize rather than transform governance 
structures in the Southern Caucasus.
1 We thank Tina Freyburg, Liesbet Hooghe, Julia Langbein, Tatiana Skripka, and Thomas Risse for their helpful 
comments on earlier versions of this paper. Research assistance of Esther Ademmer is gratefully acknowledged. 
This paper draws on findings of the research project B2 - „Gutes Regieren“ ohne den Schatten der Hierarchie? 
Korruptionsbekämpfung im südlichen Kaukasus im Rahmen der EU-Nachbarschaftspolitik, which was part of the 
Collaborative Research Center „Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood“, funded by the DFG (http://www.sfb-
governance.de/teilprojekte/projekte_phase_1/projektbereich_b/b2/index.html).
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2. The Dark Side of Europeanization
Approaches to Europeanization and domestic change have been increasingly criticized for their rather nar-
row top-down perspective which conceptualizes the process largely as a one-way street and treats target 
countries as passive recipients of EU demands for change (Olsen 2002; Kohler-Koch 2003; Jacquot/Woll 
2003). Domestic actors have other choices in responding to Europeanization than endorsing or resisting EU 
induced reforms; they can instrumentalize EU policies and institutions to advance their own interests de-
coupling them from their normative contents. Europeanization approaches have identified the differential 
empowerment of domestic actors as a key mechanism of domestic change (Cowles 2001; Börzel 2003). Yet, 
they assume that those empowered are reform-minded or liberal coalitions that pressure or argue in favor 
of compliance with EU requirements (Schimmelfennig 2005; Vachudova 2005). While veto players can still 
impede domestic change if they are powerful enough, students of Europeanization have turned a blind eye 
to the possibility that opponents of EU reforms can also use the EU to advance their power and interest, 
inducing some domestic change, which, however, goes in the opposite direction of the EU’s intentions (but 
see Elbasani 2009; Noutcheva 2009).
In short, Europeanization can have unintended and negative effects on the domestic structures of states. 
EU policies and institutions do not only empower liberal reform coalitions, to the extent that they exist in 
the first place, but can also bolster the power of incumbent authoritarian and corrupt elites. In order to 
capture this “dark side of Europeanization” (Schimmelfennig 2007), we will conceptualize the ENP as a po-
litical opportunity structure that provides opportunities and constraints to both supporters and opponents 
of the EU’s reform agenda. Which of the two gets ultimately empowered depends not only on the EU’s 
push for reforms but also on the pull of domestic actors. The degree of political liberalization and statehood 
of the countries targeted by the EU have a crucial influence on both the EU push and the domestic pull 
and therefore provide important scope conditions for the ways in which EU incentives empower domestic 
actors.
 2.1 The Power to Transform (EU Push)
Adopting the EU’s agenda for good governance entails significant costs for target countries. In general, the 
costs of adaptation for incumbent governments of democratic states with market economies are lower 
than for authoritarian regimes, which have a firm grip on economy and society. Since the EU cannot legally 
coerce or militarily force third countries into good governance, the EU’s power to transform the domestic 
structure of third countries is limited to changing the behavior of governments through incentives and 
socialization.
The ENP features three types of instruments in this regard. Firstly, capacity-building programs provide 
technical and financial assistance geared towards building institutions and capacities that are necessary 
to facilitate reform. The unconditional transfer of resources and know-how strengthens the capacity of 
governments to cope with the reform agenda (assistance) and act upon the incentives provided by the 
EU. They may also give governmental actors the necessary funds and/or legitimacy to address undesirable 
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social or economic consequences (Jacoby 2006). Secondly, the EU can use political dialogue to win over the 
minds of governmental actors through persuasion and social learning. Political dialogue aims at socializa-
tion of the target government into the norms and rules the EU seeks to promote. Finally, external incen-
tives allow manipulating the cost-benefit calculations of governments. Whereas institutional or financial 
benefits reward improved (future) behavior (positive conditionality), ex-post sanctions are imposed on 
undesirable behavior and withhold or suspend benefits for target countries (negative conditionality).
The EU’s tool box is mostly geared towards pushing governments to introduce domestic reforms. It also 
seeks to enlist the help of domestic non-state actors providing them with financial and technical resources, 
giving them access to transnational networks and pressuring government to involve them into the reform 
process (Börzel/Pamuk/Stahn 2008).
While the ENP is a one-size-fits all framework, EU push has varied across countries. The economic and 
political power of the EU renders its external relations with neighboring countries rather asymmetric. In 
principle, the ENC have much more to gain with closer relations with the EU, giving it more bargaining 
power. However, some states possess resources (gas, oil) the EU is interested in, are of strategic importance, 
have the potential to create substantial negative externalities for the EU (illegal immigration, cross-border 
crime) or have alternative allies or loyalties at their disposal (Way/Levitsky 2007). Strategic or economic 
goals can seriously undermine the consistency of the EU in pushing for domestic change, particularly if the 
target countries do not possess a membership perspective (Maier/Schimmelfennig 2007; Schimmelfennig/
Scholtz 2009). As we have shown elsewhere, the mix of instruments on which the EU relies is heavily influ-
enced by the degree of liberalization and statehood of the target country. The more democratic a regime 
and the more consolidated its statehood, the more likely the EU is to use incentives, as it has done in the 
case of Georgia, while Armenia and Azerbaijan, which are more authoritarian and whose statehood is more 
limited have been mostly exposed to socialization and capacity-building (Börzel/Pamuk/Stahn. 2008).
The domestic context of the target countries is not only an important factor in mitigating the EU’s push; it 
is also decisive in shaping the response of domestic actors to EU demands for change.
2.2 The Disposition to Perform (Domestic Pull)
The EU’s external push is not sufficient to induce domestic change (Jacoby 2006). Several studies have dem-
onstrated that it requires a significant pull by domestic actors, particularly if governments are reluctant to 
face the costs of adaptation (Kelley 2004; Zielonka/Pravda 2001; Vachudova 2005). 
Target governments are not passive recipients of the EU’s demands for change. The higher the costs of 
adaptation (misfit), the more likely they are to resist compliance, particularly if domestic veto players op-
pose domestic change. If, by contrast, norm entrepreneurs and reform coalitions are pulling EU policies and 
institutions down to the domestic level, the resistance of governments and veto players may be overcome. 
High push and pull makes Europeanization more likely and vice versa. In the rare cases where low push 
combines with high pull, chances of Europeanization are still good. High push and low pull, by contrast, 
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will not result in much domestic impact of the EU since governments have no reason to face the externally 
induced adaptation costs and the resistance of domestic veto players.
If these theoretical expectations of the Europeanization literature hold, the prospects of the EU’s attempt 
to promote good governance in the Southern Caucasus look rather bleak. Human rights, democracy, the 
rule of law and the fight against corruption require institutional reforms that challenge the political survival 
of semi-authoritarian regimes which often rely on clientelistic networks rather than outright repression 
to stay in power. Their resistance against domestic change should therefore be high. Given the lack of a 
membership perspective, the economic and political interests of the EU in the stability of the region and 
the access to its energy resources and the competition with Russia over its backyard, the EU has hardly 
any leverage to push for domestic reforms. Domestic pull, finally, is likely to be equally weak. While the 
lack of pluralistic institutions gives potential veto players not much of a voice, civil society organizations 
are too weak to act as norm entrepreneurs. High costs combined with low external push and domestic pull 
make the Southern Caucasus a least likely case for Europeanization. Indeed, the transformative power of 
the EU has been very limited – despite or rather because of the domestic changes the three neighborhood 
countries have introduced in response to the EU’s demand to fight corruption.
Our case studies will show that we do find instances of Europeanization, which have, however, stabilized 
rather than transformed domestic structures. The pathologies of Europeanization are explained by the 
successful strategy of incumbent government to selectively adopt anti-corruption measures pushed by the 
EU’s good governance agenda to advance their own interests and consolidate their power.
3. External Push and Domestic Pull in the Southern Caucasus
3.1 High Misfit, Prohibitive Costs and Limited EU Push
Since the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, the relationships between the EU and the ENC have evolved 
in several steps, each envisaging a further intensification of the bilateral cooperation. Likewise, the EU’s 
demand for improving governance by engaging in substantial domestic reforms has increased significantly 
over the past years. When Eastern enlargement placed Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia into the EU’s 
immediate vicinity, the fear of political instability, organized crime and illegal migration induced the EU to 
once again deploy its transformative power this time trying to hit beyond its borders. The ENP launched in 
2004 aims at fostering peace, stability and prosperity in the EU’s new near abroad (European Commission 
2004).
The ENP intends to build a “ring of friends” (European Commission 2003: 4) that share European norms and 
principles and are willing to adapt their domestic institutions and policies respectively. Generally speaking, 
the ENP reform agenda includes three major dimensions: democracy promotion, market integration and 
(energy) security cooperation (Weber et al. 2007). Good governance constitutes a key cross-cutting issue 
that is mainstreamed into the Action Plans (AP) concluded with all three countries in 2006 after they had 
been included in the ENP. It covers issues such as improving electoral legislation, conducting free and fair 
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elections, ensuring the separation of power (particularly with regard to the judiciary), encouraging the 
development of political parties and civil society organizations, granting the independence of media, pro-
tecting human rights and civil liberties (particularly minority rights) and fighting corruption (Börzel/Stahn/
Pamuk 2010).
In order to promote this ambitious reform agenda, the European Commission has heavily relied on the 
top-down methods and instruments of its former accession policy with regard to the CEE countries (Kelley 
2006). When it comes to the practical application of the Action Plans in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, 
the EU has clearly focused on enhancing the effectiveness of state institutions in providing public goods 
and services rather than promoting democracy and human rights (Börzel/Stahn/Pamuk 2010). Its empha-
sis on output-related reforms reflects a preference for political stability over democratic change (Börzel/
Pamuk/Stahn 2009). Still, making state institutions more effective implies a strong emphasis on the fight 
against corruption, which implies huge costs of adaptation.
The Southern Caucasus countries have ranged among the most corrupt countries in the world, although 
scope and form of corruption differ. While Georgia has significantly improved its record since the Rose 
Revolution, the situation has remained more or less stable in Azerbaijan and has deteriorated in Armenia 
(Figure 1). Despite the differences, corruption is pervasive in all three countries, including Georgia. Tightly 
organized patronage networks permeate the public sphere and help sustain a stable equilibrium of infor-
mal institutions through “vertical organization and horizontal coordination of corruption” (Johnston 1999: 
15). The extensive misuse of social networks for particularistic purposes favors certain political interests 
and excludes others from the distribution of public goods (Drury et al. 2006; Stokes 2007).
Finally, uncontested control of the incumbent regime, the lack of economic alternatives and a compara-
tively weak civil society further add to the institutionalization of oligarchic monopolies (Shleifer/Vishny 
1993). Corruption does not only yield huge private rents but also allows incumbent elites to control the ac-
cess to power and resources securing the loyalty of key domestic actors (International Crisis Group 2004).
Figure 1: Corruption in the Southern Caucasus
Transparency International 
Corruption Perception Index Armenia Georgia Azerbaijan
2004 (rank out of 146 countries) 3.1 (82.) 2.0 (133.) 1.9 (140.) 
2006 (rank out of 163 countries) 2.9 (93.) 2.8 (99.) 2.4 (130.)
2008 (rank out of 180 countries) 2.9 (109.) 3.9 (67.) 1.9 (158.)
2010 (rank out of 178 countries) 2.6 (123.) 3.8 (68.) 2.4 (134.)
The scale ranges from 0 (high corruption) to 10 (low corruption).
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The EU Action Plans require the three Caucasian neighborhood countries (CNC) to accede, ratify and imple-
ment international conventions that are related to the fight against corruption, including the UN conven-
tion on Corruption, the Council of Europe Criminal and Civil Law Conventions or the OECD Convention on 
combating bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. Georgia, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan have agreed to join international anti-corruption networks, such as the ‘Group of States against 
Corruption’ (GRECO), and to implement their recommendations. Finally, each country has some additional 
provisions that largely concentrate on promoting anti-corruption measures within the administration and/
or the law enforcement agencies or on improving the legal framework for the prosecution of corruption-
related crimes. The required actions are quite similar for the three Southern Caucasus states and slightly 
vary with regard to the specificity of certain measures (cf. Börzel/Pamuk/Stahn 2008).
All three CNC have negotiated with the EU a rather ambitious reform agenda, which constitutes a com-
prehensive misfit with domestic institutions, policies and political processes. The legal and administrative 
changes required by the EU challenge the political survival of incumbent elites who often rely on clientelis-
tic networks rather than outright repression to stay in power.
Yet, the EU has not exerted sufficient external push to generate pressure for adaptation that could trigger 
domestic change. The ENP and the Eastern Partnership were explicitly designed to provide an alternative 
to membership. Basically, they offer deeper cooperation and economic integration in exchange for political 
and economic reforms. While the EU cannot invoke accession conditionality to push for domestic change, 
it may (threaten to) suspend bilateral agreements, withhold assistance and impose political sanctions (e.g. 
visa bans). Likewise, the EU can reward progress by upgrading bilateral relations (e.g. association agree-
ments), lifting trade restrictions (e.g. deep and comprehensive trade agreement), simplifying visa regimes 
or extending the scope of assistance. These possibilities notwithstanding, the EU has been very reluctant 
to use conditionality. The CNC have felt little pressure to engage in domestic reforms to meet ENP goals and 
requirements. It has almost exclusively relied on capacity building and political dialogue. Only once has the 
EU invoked negative conditionality, when it restricted the provision of technical and financial assistance to 
Georgia in 2003 due to a lack of progress in fighting corruption (cf. Börzel/Stahn/Pamuk 2010).
The strategy of promoting reforms through positive incentives, in turn, has been hampered by vaguely 
defined reform goals and the absence of any benchmarks for measuring progress. Moreover, the lack of a 
credible membership perspective mitigates the prospects of socialization and social learning.
Last but not least, the EU’s main strategy to communicate the principles of human rights, democracy, the 
rule of law and good governance as basic values of the cooperation partnership has been to socialize the 
CNC partners through a regular political dialogue on these issues. Rather than imposing “a pre-determined 
set of priorities” (European Commission 2004: 8), the EU’s explicit intention is to create mutual support 
of these principles by means of partnership, joint commitment and ownership. Being a centerpiece of the 
ENP reform agenda, good governance and the fight against corruption have thus been an integral part of 
the political dialogue in all three countries. However, as in the case of the other instruments a mixture of 
indetermination, vagueness and the lack of EU leverage have hampered the effectiveness of the approach. 
Thus, it is hard to say to what extent political dialogue has fostered socialization and social learning pro-
cesses at all.
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Overall, the tools used by the EU to translate its preferences into national reform priorities and specific 
measures have been considerably stalled by the vagueness of the defined reform goals, the lack of time-
frames and the absence of responsive reform entrepreneurs (cf. Börzel/Stahn/Pamuk 2010). Closer rela-
tions with the EU seem to have little attraction for countries such as the CNC that face extremely high 
adaptation costs in approximating the EU.
Moreover, the EU relation with the three CNC is particularly complex, as Georgia capitalizes on its Western 
orientation and aspires nothing less than membership in NATO and EU, Azerbaijan stresses its genuine 
(oriental) values and commands control over substantial resources, and finally Armenia is geographically 
isolated and maintains close relations with Russia. As a result, the resonance of EU norms and values with 
the domestic institutions of the CNC has been far lower than in case of the CEEC.
Another crucial factor is that unlike in the CEEC accession process, the EU has done little to empower non-
state actors in the CNC. Since 2004, the EU requires ENP partner governments to consult and cooperate 
with non-state actors and civil organizations in the formulation and implementation of the national re-
form agendas. Yet, the EU has hardly enforced this requirement. Unlike in other foreign policy frameworks, 
it has also refrained from upgrading the status of non-state actors within the political dialogue (Börzel/
Stahn/Pamuk 2010). The new Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, which shall facilitate a dialogue 
between the CNC governments and local civil society organizations (CSO), has so far done little to change 
this (Boonstra/Shapovalova 2010).
3.2 Weak Pull and Strategic Elites
While EU push has been limited, there is not much domestic pull either. The importance of civil society or-
ganizations in fighting corruption in transition countries is widely recognized. CSO play a vital role in moni-
toring government actions and making sure that the reforms respect both national and international laws. 
In lack of state capacity, civil society organizations may also provide an alternative source of knowledge and 
expertise that enhances to the quality of the anti-corruption programs (cf. Demidov/Panfilova 2001).
Despite signs that civil organizations in the Southern Caucasus have been benefiting from external capacity 
building and transnational linkages with Western NGOs, trade unions and party foundations, their role in 
public life and policy is rather low. The idea of an autonomous civil society is still a largely foreign concept 
in the post-Soviet Southern Caucasus. Moreover, most local organizations tend to function as all-purpose 
advocacy agencies focusing on a variety of issues that are perceived as important, ranging from democracy 
building through poverty alleviation to childcare. In many cases, this has resulted in a dilution of expertise 
and dissipation of resources. Finally, many of the local civil society groups are small-scale organizations 
with limited personnel that often are hardly equipped to deal with essential technical details. As a conse-
quence, most domestic non-state actors do not have sufficient organizational and ideational resources to 
mobilize larger parts of the society. This lack of capacity has often served as a pretext for government actors 
to deny civil society organizations access to the policy process. Additionally, the channeling of resources 
for civil society building has frequently given rise to a short-lived mushrooming of NGOs that – in the worst 
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case – use external funding as a mere opportunity for income generation (Matveeva 2008).
Next to limited capacities, the low degree of political liberalization of the CNC circumscribes the political 
autonomy of civil society. A notable exception was the democratic surge of the Rose Revolution in Georgia 
that was mainly championed by various grassroots organizations in 2004. The promising event, however, 
did not bring about democratic consolidation, as the recent incident of the 2008 war illustrate (Laverty 
2008; Tudoroiu 2007). In Armenia and Azerbaijan, the situation is even worse. Rule of law and democracy 
are weakly institutionalized, resulting in the severe limitation of political rights and civil liberties. Domestic 
activists, who engage in politically and economically sensitive areas such as the fight against corruption, 
live in constant danger to be assaulted or prosecuted on the basis of false accusations and fictitious evi-
dence. Finally, governing elites have victimized potential change agents, denying business actors and civil 
society organizations self-sustainable income opportunities if they refuse to being co-opted into the clien-
tele system (Laverty 2008; Karatnycky 2001).
Business is to a significant extent controlled by clientelistic interests in all three CNC. Gradual economic 
reforms and in-transparent privatization processes cemented a close affiliation of the economic and the 
political sphere. Domestic companies lack the incentives to press for the introduction of a sound economic 
framework and the rule of law, precisely because they benefit from market distortions. Although multina-
tional companies have sought access to the CNC, particularly to the energy sector in Azerbaijan, they have 
little interest in spoiling their relationship with the incumbent regime by pushing for domestic reforms 
(Hoff/Stiglitz 2004).
4. Fighting Corruption in the Southern Caucasus
The EU has formulated similar demands for the fight against corruption in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, 
causing similar misfit. Limited statehood and democracy have largely prevented this misfit from translating 
into systematic pressure for adaptation from above and from below. Yet, despite high costs and low pres-
sure, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia have adopted and implemented anti-corruption measures.
4.1 Introducing Institutional Change
All three CNC have ratified and given effect to the major international conventions on the fight against cor-
ruption (cf. Börzel/Stahn/Pamuk 2010). In order to abide with their international obligations, the govern-
ments of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan have introduced a number of institutional changes. They have 
developed anti-corruption strategies and anti-corruption action plans, which are drafted by a national Anti 
Corruption Council and whose implementation is supervised by special Commissions. Moreover, the pros-
ecutor offices are charged with the investigation and prosecution of crimes related to corruption. Finally, 
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan have introduced several legislative changes.
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Figure 2: Domestic Institutional Change in the Southern Caucasus
Azerbaijan Armenia Georgia
Policy Formulation Inter-Agency Commission 
for Combating Corruption 
(2004), located at the 
Cabinet of Ministers
Inter-Agency Commission 
for Combating Corruption 
(2004), located at the 
Cabinet of Ministers
Anti-Corruption Council 
(2004)
Expert Group (2008)
Anti-Corruption Policy 
Coordination Council 
(2001)
National Security Council 
(2005)
Policy Implementation Inter-Agency Commission 
for Combating Corruption 
(2004)
Anti-Corruption Strategy 
Monitoring Commission 
(2004)
Department for 
Coordinating Anti-
Corruption Policies (2001)
State Minister of Reform 
(2005)
Inter-Agency Coordination 
Council of Combating 
Corruption (2008)
Investigation and 
Prosecution
Anti-Corruption 
Department in Prosecutor 
General’s Office (2005)
Anti-Corruption 
Department in Prosecutor 
General’s Office (2004)
Prosecutor General’s 
Office (2005)
Inter-Agency Coordination 
Council of Combating 
Corruption (2008)
State Program on 
Combating Corruption, 
including Implementation 
Action Plan (2004-2006)
National Strategy on 
Increasing Transparency 
and Combating Corruption, 
including Implementation 
Action Plan (2007-2011)
Anti-Corruption Strategy, 
including Implementation 
Action Plan
(2003-2007 and 2009-
2012)
National Anti-Corruption 
Strategy (2005 and 2010), 
including Action Plan 
for the Anti-Corruption 
Strategy (2005-2006)
Overall, the three Southern Caucasus Countries have introduced similar institutions to meet the demand of 
the EU and other international actors to fight corruption. Given the high misfit and low pressure for adapta-
tion, the extent of the domestic changes we observe is not trivial. We should at least see some decoupling, 
     Anti-Corruption Agencies
     Anti-Corruption State Programs and Strategiess
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which would also explain why corruption has remained stable in Azerbaijan and even increased in Armenia 
(Figure 1). Yet, as the next section will show, all three governments have implemented anti-corruption mea-
sures. These changes have not been induced by EU incentives and socialization efforts. They are driven by 
the differential empowerment of incumbent elites that have instrumentalized the fight against corruption 
to undermine the power of their political opponents. As a result, Europeanization has had little effect on 
the informal institutions of clientelism and patronage. EU demands for fighting corruption have helped to 
stabilize rather than transform bad governance in the Southern Caucasus.
4.2 Azerbaijan: Settling Internal Power Struggles
Azerbaijan has undertaken quite some changes to fight corruption and the European Commission as well as 
the OECD have acknowledged the progress the country has made (European Commission 2006: 4; OECD/
ACN 2010). Yet, its efforts do not seem to have much effect on levels of corruption (Figure 1). Somewhat 
paradoxically, this is not only due to a decoupling of formal institutions and behavioral practices as sug-
gested by the literature (Frichova 2010; Bertelsmann Stiftung 2010b). Rather, the Azeri government has 
been quite selective in implementing and enforcing anti-corruption measures in a way that consolidates 
their power by disciplining political rivals and centralizing the control over the corruption system.
Azerbaijan’s formal political system is characterized by a strong concentration of power in the hands of the 
executive branch controlled by the president and his apparatus (Franke et al. 2009). In the shadow of these 
formal institutions, the president relies on an informal division of power in which various networks headed 
by powerful individuals compete with each other (International Crisis Group 2010). The leaders of these 
aligned networks hold the so-called “power ministries” of interior, defense and national security. The inner 
circle of the ruling clique is embedded in a wider network of allies that do not share power as such but par-
ticipate in the control and distribution of financial and economic resources. It mostly consists of business-
men or so-called oligarchs that have been promoted to ‘secondary’ positions in government (International 
Crisis Group 2010). The president and his extended family network control the ruling clique of ministers 
and their respective networks. The president acts as a gatekeeper to power and resources. Furthermore, 
he controls all exchanges within the various aligned networks and mediates in cases of conflict among its 
leaders. The presidential administration, in turn, is headed by one of his most powerful allies and functions 
as a hub that brokers and coordinates power in the political system (Collins 2004; Wedel 2003).
The fight against corruption has become to play a role in calibrating this informal system of clan politics. The 
incumbent regime has exploited anti-corruption policies to settle internal power struggles and tighten his 
grip on the exchange of resources. Like all other major policies, the president initiates and regulates anti-
corruption measures by presidential decree, the executive’s “frequently used mechanism of governance” 
(Shaffer 2004: 29), which is exempt from any substantial judicial or legislative oversight. Furthermore, the 
head of the presidential administration concomitantly also chairs the State Civil Service Committee as well 
as the Commission for Combating Corruption, which puts him in a key power position (International Crisis 
Group 2010). In addition, crucial areas that affect the formulation and implementation of anti-corruption 
policies, such as the budget approval process, the institutional setup, investigation and internal auditing 
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mechanisms and the office of the ombudsman, are ultimately subject to presidential competences. The 
legislative and judiciary branches mainly carry out the function of confirming presidential policies (Freedom 
House 2008).
The overpowering presidential administration thus monopolizes the anti-corruption agenda and domi-
nates all other agencies charged with the fight against corruption (Badalov/Mehdy 2005). The executive’s 
excessive control of the country’s anti-corruption agenda allows for a selective implementation of EU de-
mands to direct the flow of spoils and to eliminate income opportunities that could empower self-sus-
tainable competitors beyond the president’s and his closest ally’s control. Likewise, the Anti-Corruption 
Commission and the Department for Combating Corruption have been unwilling to take on close allies of 
the president (International Crisis Group 2010).
A prominent example is the case of Ali Insanov, who was one of the original founders of the ruling Yeni 
Azerbaycan party and once considered one of Azerbaijan’s most influential cabinet members. Heading the 
so-called Yeraz network, a small but influential group of ethnic Azerbaijanis from Armenia, Insanov had 
played an active part in the 1993 return of the Aliyev family to power. As remuneration the Yeraz network 
became junior partner in ruling power arrangement and its leader was appointed health minister. In 2005, 
Insanov fell from grace for a ‘squaring of accounts’ with rivaling factions within the ruling clique. Since 
2003, the influence of the Yeraz network had gradually declined as the leadership changed from Aliyev 
Senior to Aliyev Junior (Sidikov 2004; Avioutskii 2007). Accused of corruption and abuse of power, Insanov 
was stripped off all his offices and put on trial in 2007. A similar case exhibits the more complex side of the 
power arrangement. At first sight, ex-minister of economic development Farhad Aliyev (no relation with 
the president) also was victim to a rivalry among the so-called oligarch group of business interests close to 
the ruling circle (cf. Eurasianet 2007). Aliyev was said to belong to a “new guard” of politicians that were 
reckoned (mostly by the West) as reform-minded, Western-educated allies of the young president. Some 
observers claim that Aliyev clashed and lost over spoils with a fellow minister and protégée of the “old 
guard” headed by the chairman of the presidential apparatus (cf. Ismayilov 2006). Other sources, however, 
claim that Aliyev was punished for trying to deceive his patron in financial matters. In any case, Aliyev was 
charged with a coup attempt, corruption and abuse of office, embezzlement of state property, smuggling 
and tax evasion and, together with Insanov, convicted to several years of imprisonment (BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring Service 2008).2
In sum, the efforts of Azerbaijan’s authorities to fight corruption have focused on strengthening the state 
apparatus, expanding its control over society and fostering the power of the incumbents. As a result, the 
government of Azerbaijan has mainly called on the EU’s programs for technical assistance and twinning 
projects that aim at capacity building of the executive central state agencies. Genuine public participation 
and civil oversight, by contrast, is not part of the scheme. On the contrary, the regime has used corruption 
allegations to control its own camp and to undermine civil society actors and representatives of the media 
who have become too critical of the authorities (Freedom House 2008a). Although the level of corruption 
has not decreased, its forms and scope have changed. Next to administrative corruption including outright 
bottom-up bribing and decentralized instances of extortion, political corruption has gained prominence 
2 The property of both ex-ministers was confiscated and auction in favour of the treasury in 2009.
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and together with anti-corruption has become part of a sophisticated governance system controlled by the 
incumbent elites (International Crisis Group 2010).
4.3 Armenia: Pleasing External Donors
Armenia has been under strong pressure of international donors and its Diaspora to reduce the ever grow-
ing corruption. Its government has adopted and implemented anti-corruption measures. However, corrup-
tion has increased rather than decreased (Figure 1), which is at least partly due to a similar exploitation 
of the fight against corruption as we observe it in Azerbaijan, albeit with a different purpose. Rather than 
undermining the power of political opposition, the Armenian government has used the fight against cor-
ruption to deflect international criticism ensuring external aid and attracting foreign direct investment.
The incumbent regime in Armenia is more united than that of Azerbaijan. Its locus of power mainly rests 
with the security apparatus, including the armed forces and related veteran organizations such as the 
Yerkrapah (Bedevian/Stepanian 2006).3 Armenia’s historical irredentism and the Karabakh conflict have 
created a strong sense of national identity that has bound together the country’s various rivaling elite fac-
tions and makes them more reluctant to engage in internal power struggles. At the same time, power con-
flicts coagulate along nationalistic issues (Karabakh and Turkey) rather than personal feuds (Hovannisian 
2008), which renders the use of anti-corruption measures more difficult. Most importantly, the power bal-
ance within government is organized differently than in Azerbaijan. A ‘hyper-executive’ with wide-reaching 
competences dominates the state apparatus (Shahnazaryan 2003). However, the parliament plays a com-
paratively stronger role in the informal power arrangement than in Azerbaijan. In order to protect their 
businesses from the grasp of the incumbent elite within the state apparatus, the so-called oligarchs have 
increasingly assumed membership in parliament (Freedom House 2008b). Furthermore, genuine political 
parties that enjoy support from the influential Diaspora organizations have succeeded in building a strong-
hold in parliament (Dudwick 1993). As a consequence, Armenia’s president relies on a much broader range 
of influential network leaders as well as organizations. He seeks to strike a balance between different elite 
groupings within the security apparatus, the executive and to a lesser extent the parliament.
Similar to Azerbaijan, corruption clean-ups serve as an instrument of internal power struggle. However, 
this occurs on a much lower regime level, including purges in the judiciary and medium-level state bureau-
cracy. As the case of the 1999 parliamentary shooting demonstrates, serious high-level infighting is “solved” 
by other means (Hoffmann 1999).
Even more important than settling internal power struggles, the fight against corruption serves the in-
cumbent regime to attract external resources. Armenia is much more dependent on external financial aid 
than Azerbaijan (Libaridian 2004). In 1994, Armenia suffered a considerable economic setback due to the 
3 The Union of Volunteers Yerkrapah (Guard of the Country) is a paramilitary organization that was founded in 1993 
during the Karbakh war. After the cease-fire in 1994 Yerkrapah has become an influential pressure group whose 
members hold important positions in the national police and army.
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closure of its borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan. As a consequence of this regional isolation, business op-
portunities are limited and Armenia’s economy is heavily dominated by oligarchic monopolies. At the same 
time, the nationalistic Armenian Diaspora is quite influential in domestic politics. Consisting of very dispa-
rate groupings, including various organizations and parties in the United States, France and the Lebanon, 
the Diaspora provides considerable financial aid and other resources to the country (Gillespie/Okruhlik 
1991; International Organization for Migration 2008). Yet, corruption and take-over of shares by the state 
have been a major impediment for Diaspora investors. “If patriotism helps to buy a ticket to visit Armenia, 
it is not enough of an argument to part with one’s life savings, without any guarantee of profit, and without 
any state protection” (Manaseryan 2004: 20). This holds also true, of course, for foreign investors.
With the country’s ever more rampant corruption (Figure 1), Diaspora organizations have supported the 
implementation of domestic reforms of the public administration and judiciary, customs, tax, education, 
public health and other sectors (Transparency International Armenia 2006; Aghajanyan 2010). Under in-
creasing international pressure, the Armenian government launched some publicly visible attempts to 
crack down corruption, including the sacking of corrupt officials in the tax department, customs service 
and police. Given their lack of systemic effect, such changes in personnel have been criticized for being 
merely symbolic (Grigoryan 2008).
In sum, anti-corruption policies have mostly served to please the international donor community and 
attract foreign direct investments in order to overcome the economic isolation of the country. With no 
need to control the flow of rents and to eliminate political rivals, the Armenian government has addressed 
political and administrative corruption only symbolically as to avoid the discontent of international donor 
organizations.
4.4 Georgia: Consolidating New Power Structures
In the first decade after its transition, Georgia had done little to fight the pervasive corruption that crip-
pled its state institutions and its economy (Darchiashvili/ Nodia 2003; Kikabidze /Losaberidze 2000). Only 
when external donors started to voice their discontent threatening to withdraw their support, President 
Shevardnadze introduced some formal changes. Much earlier than his counterparts in the region, he de-
clared 1997 the year of the “crusade against corruption” (McGiffert Ekedahl/Goodman 2001: 12) and the 
government launched its first anti-corruption campaign. At the same time, however, Shevardnadze made 
sure that he remained the ‘gatekeeper’ to international financial aid. In order to build and maintain power, 
the president used these resources to ensure the support of various power brokers and warlords. In ex-
change for their subordination, these power brokers were given the right to control and exploit certain 
sectors, in particular import and export, and take their share of revenues. As a result, vested interests 
and organized crime increasingly undermined the state apparatus (Wheatley/Zürcher 2008). In September 
2001, the minister of justice, Mikheil Saakashvili, left the government and founded an opposition party, the 
United National Movement, pledging to take issue with the Shevardnadze government over corruption.
After Shevardnadze had tried to steal the vote in the 2003 elections, mass popular protests and international 
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pressure forced him to resign from office. With presidential and parliamentary elections, Mikheil Saakashvili 
and his party could secure large parts of the electoral support. He declared the fight against corruption to 
be the core of his government policies (Wheatley 2005). The new government immediately took action 
against corruption within the law enforcement agencies, resulting in the complete dismantling of the traf-
fic police, which had been considered as one of the most corrupt institutions of the country. 15.000 officers 
lost their jobs practically overnight. In addition, a special force of 30.000 men and women attached to 
the Ministry of Interior was dissolved and all members fired. Reforms of the police forces continued with 
investments in modern equipment, the creation of a new police academy, mandatory exams and training 
for police officers, and considerable increases in the salaries. At the same time, draconian fines for minor 
offences were adopted. Petty corruption was upgraded as a serious crime, warranting several years of 
imprisonment (Boda/Kakachia 2005; Hiscock 2005).
Like his predecessor, Saakashvili placed the fight against corruption under the direct control of his govern-
ment. Since 2006 and 2008, respectively, the Minister of State Reform and the Minister of Justice, who 
heads the Inter-Agency Coordination Council of Combating Corruption, have been charged with the draft-
ing and implementation of anti-corruption policies. While state authorities resolutely targeted petty cor-
ruption at lower levels of bureaucracy, Sakaashvili has been accused of turning a blind eye to major cor-
ruption and abuse of power among his closest allies he had allegedly placed in many prominent positions. 
Similar to Azerbaijan, corruption has not been eradicated but rather transmogrified into elite corruption 
(Chiabrishvili 2009). Next to rewarding his closest associates, Saakashvili has also used the fight against cor-
ruption to oust political opponents. When the former minister of defense and close associate of Saakashvili, 
Irakli Okruashvili, left the government in 2006, formed an opposition party and accused the President of 
numerous crimes, he was arrested on corruption charges. A court found him guilty of large-scale extortion 
and sentenced him to eleven years in prison. What was widely perceived as political persecution sparked 
mass protests and contributed to the rise of antigovernment rallies in 2008 (Freedom House 2008c). Finally, 
the eradication of entrenched corruption has helped to boost foreign direct investments and economic 
stabilization. The EU, the IMF and other international actors, which had suspended assistance before the 
Rose Revolution, stepped up their financial support for Georgia’s new government. The EU almost doubled 
its support (European Commission 2005); the net official development assistance and official aid increased 
by more than ten times between 2002 and 2007; so did the foreign direct investments (World Bank a; 
Index Mundi).4 In 2006, the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation declared Georgia the 
“best reformer in the world” regarding its business environment (Freedom House 2007). The fight against 
corruption is an integral part of the liberal economic reforms the Saakashvili government has been pushing. 
While the minister of state reforms, Kakha Bendukidze, has pushed privatization as a major solution to cor-
ruption, he claims that anti-corruption measures promote economic growth by scrapping ineffective public 
institutions (European Stability Initiative 2010).
In sum, the Saakashvili regime has successfully used anti-corruption measures to break up and replace the 
power structures established by the Shevardnadze regime, to consolidate his new power structures, to 
4 Cf. The World Bank Data on Georgia available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator and Index Mundi on FDI, 
net inflows in Georgia 1997 - 2009 available at http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/indicators/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.DT/
compare?country=ge#country=ge.
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step up international support and attract foreign direct investment and to promote his libertarian reform 
agenda. The better fit of the international anti-corruption agenda and the political preferences of the in-
cumbents in Georgia as well as the country’s dependency on foreign aid largely explain why it has a much 
better record in fighting corruption than Azerbaijan and Armenia.
5. Conclusion
The Southern Caucasus is a least likely case for external Europeanization. With the ENP, the EU has devel-
oped a sophisticated framework to transform the domestic structures of former Soviet republics ridden 
by bad governance. But misfit is high and in the absence of a membership perspective the EU has little to 
offer to pay-off at least some of the adaptation costs. Nor has the EU exerted much pressure for adaptation, 
relying on assistance and political dialogue rather than (negative) conditionality. Finally, in the incumbent 
regimes there are hardly any reform coalitions the EU could empower, while reform coalitions in society 
do lack sufficient influence. While according to our expectations we should not see much domestic change 
in terms of genuine Europeanization, the governments of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan have in fact re-
sponded to the EU’s demand for good governance. Georgia has been most active in fighting corruption. The 
EU’s anti-corruption policies resonated with the political agenda of the Saakashvili government lowering 
the costs of adaptation. At the same time, the EU and other Western donors promised to support the fight 
against corruption by additional financial means and closer cooperation. Armenia is as dependent on inter-
national assistance as Georgia. Its ruling elite has been less enthusiastic in fighting corruption but started to 
enact policies when external pressure rose. Even Azerbaijan, which has been most reluctant to endorse the 
EU’s good governance agenda and is least dependent on external resources, established similar institutions 
and policies as its two neighbors. Finally, all three regimes have implemented anti-corruption measures 
that have taken some effects. Thus, the EU does have an impact on countries that lack a membership 
perspective even if costs of adaptation are high, external pressure is low and there are no liberal reform 
coalitions to pull EU policies down to the domestic level. Europeanization is driven by the differential em-
powerment of incumbent elites that align their preference for power consolidation with the EU’s demand 
for domestic change. Corruption is fought where it helps to oust political opponents, deflect international 
criticism and attract foreign assistance and investments. Due to differences in statehood and democracy, 
Europeanization has taken different effects in the three countries (Figure 3). While it has given rise to simi-
lar institutional changes, behavioral practices and the overall impact on corruption differ. Georgia, which 
due to its dependency on external aid is the most pluralistic of the three countries, has suffered most from 
serious problems of limited statehood. Therefore, the Georgian authorities have used the international 
anti-corruption agenda to strengthen statehood by improving the capacity of state institutions to enforce 
public policies and fostering economic growth. In Azerbaijan, the least democratic and pluralistic regime, 
the incumbent elites have exploited the fight against corruption to oust political opponents and restrict 
pluralism. In Armenia, which is stuck in transition and shows the highest degree of statehood, the imple-
mentation of anti-corruption measures has been mostly symbolic to deflect international criticism and 
ensure the flow of foreign aid and investments, particularly of its Diaspora. Given the better fit between the 
EU’s demand for good governance and the preferences of the Saakashvili government, Georgia has made 
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greater progress in reducing corruption levels than Azerbaijan and particularly Armenia, where endemic 
corruption even increased due to the complete ‘oligarchization’ of economy. Yet, in all three countries, the 
incumbent elites have ultimately captured the EU’s anti-corruption agenda to tighten their control over 
the allocation of resources within the political system and to attract additional resources from the outside. 
Europeanization can trigger domestic institutional change in third countries that suffer from low levels of 
statehood and democracy and (therefore) lack an accession perspective, if it empowers incumbent elites. 
Rather than transforming structures, however, Europeanization helps to stabilize the political and eco-
nomic structures of neighborhood countries. While they improved their statehood, the level of democracy 
has remained quite stable on a rather low level (Figure 3).
Figure 3: Democracy and Statehood in the Southern Caucasus5
Armenia Georgia Azerbaijan
Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index 
on 
Statehood
8,8 (2010)
4,0 (2003)
6,3 (2010)
2,0 (2003)
7,0 (2010)
3,0 (2003)
Freedom House 
Freedom in the World 
Index on Democracy
5 (2010)
6 (2003)
4 (2010)
4 (2003)
5.5 (2010)
5.5 (2003)
The scale of the Bertelsmann Transformation Index on Statehood ranges from1 (failed state) to 10 (consolidated state). 
The scale of the Freedom House - Freedom in the Wolrd Index on Democracy ranges from 1 (free) to 7 (not free).
5 Cf. the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) country reports on Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, 2003 and 
2010 and the Freedom House country reports on Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia 2003 and 2010.
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